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Today only a handful of people are privy to the secret of life and how to
manipulate and change it... It is now only a matter of years before biologists
will be able to irreversibly change the evolutionary wisdom of millions of years
with the creation of new plants, new animals and new forms of humans and
post-human beings.
{Ted Howard and Jeremy Rifkin, Who Should Play God?(1977)
A. Introduction
To the Rifkins of the mid-70s, the threat of biotechnology was as real as
its promise. While enthusiasts for the new science certainly existed, it was the
alarmists whose fears of new genes run amok shaped much of the contemporary
thinking on the subject. These fears also shaped the regulation of biotechnology
by the federal government{rst NIH, then the FDA{to which critics looked for
scientic guidance and regulatory restraint. During the twenty years since this
debate began, Rifkin's opinions have not changed dramatically (he now opines
on the subject under the aegis of the oddly market-sounding Foundation on
Economic Trends), but biotechnology has changed enormously. The eld is no
longer mere science: some 25 biotech products are now on the market for drug,
environmental, and food applications; roughly 300 more are in various stages of
the developmental pipeline. Nor is it fringe science:
more than 301 of the research budgets of traditional pharmaceutical compa-
nies are now devoted to biotechnological products. Yet like many other areas
of government oversight where statutes and administrative regulations lag tech-
nological change, the Rifkin legacy of strict regulatory oversight has continued
to be the dominant philosophy of governmental regulation of biotechnology. In
many cases, biotech
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products continue to be regulated more extensively than identical chemical
compounds.
Why should this bother us? As recently as 1993, when ve hepatitis pa-
tients died after receiving the drug aluridine, which had been engineered from
recombinant DNA, biotechnology has demonstrated its relative immaturity as
a science (modern chemistry is hundreds of years old) and the occasionally fatal
risks that result. Human society has waited thousands of generations for the
discovery of aluridine. Why can't it wait a few more years while the FDA sorts
out these risks and ensures that these new drugs are safe and eective?
This paper argues that while the approval process may be trivial in terms of
geologic time, it is an eternity when viewed from the perspective of the biotech
industry. A delay of even a few months can mean life or death for a nascent
one-product biotech company. Spread over an entire industry over a period of
years, such delays impose very real costs on companies which may be forced to
curtail or eliminate valuable drug research. In the near term, such costs are
borne by public shareholders and venture capitalists who voluntarily subject
themselves to a risky market and seemingly do not deserve much sympathy.
Annualized return rates do not seem to present a very compelling case when
human life is at stake. But these same costs are ultimately borne by consumers
in several more subtle ways that do put real lives on the line: (i) Consumers are
denied use of drugs that are awaiting approval; (ii) When drugs nally do make
it through the developmental pipeline, delays in the process increase industry
costs and in the absence of governmental
3c 
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price regulation, those increased costs are passed along to consumers in the
form of higher drug prices, raising issues of access and regressive taxation; and
(iii) Most insidiously, consumers are denied the benet of drugs that will never
be discovered or whose discovery will never be exploited because increased in-
dustry costs imply reduced spending on research and development.
If these costs are so great why can't we see them? This crisis, if it exists,
should be visible at both the industry and consumer levels. First, as to the
industry, why have we not seen a wave of biotech bankruptcies if the industry is
truly in crisis? The answer is that the industry has managed to keep itself out
of bankruptcy (so far) by obtaining nancing on highly discounted terms that
are extremely unfavorable to issuing companies; in eect these companies are
slowly giving away their equity in a way that is less visible, but no less profound,
than a bankruptcy ling. Biotech rms have responded to this shrinkage of
capital by reducing spending on new drug discoveries and development. Unlike
traditional pharmaceutical rms like Merck which can cut marketing and other
overhead costs before they cut R&D, biotech rms, which often are little more
than laboratories dressed up in corporate form, rarely have infrastructure that
can be cut temporarily to save money. As a result, we should expect to see
markedly fewer drugs entering the developmental pipeline; since these drugs
typically would not emerge from the approval process for ve to ten years, it
may be nearly that long before our society realizes that the promised ood of
biotech drugs has slowed to a trickle.
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Second, why have consumers, who have the most at stake, not been more
vocal in calling attention to the biotech crisis? To the extent they have been
organized, consumers have tried to call attention to the crisis. Eorts by various
AIDS groups and by the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, for example, have helped
draw scrutiny to the regulatory process at FDA. But constituencies are rarely
this organized and the industry is therefore drafted as a stand-in for current and
prospective ailing consumers. Yet the industry is in a remarkably precarious
position: it may criticize the FDA, yet it must simultaneously depend on the
FDA for approval. Since the agency notoriously (and unavoidably) exercises
discretion within certain broad limits, biotech rms with just a few months'
cash in the till fear that for all of the frustration they feel privately, they cannot
criticize the agency publicly for fear of bureaucratic retribution.
Another way that we might be able to measure these invisible costs is to look
at what consumers have gotten from the biotech industry. In the 20 year life span
of the industry, with 1310 rms now in existence (many of them, admittedly, of
recent vintage), fewer than 30 new biotech drugs have been approved by FDA
for use by consumers.
Most commentators have pointed to health care reform as the main culprit
in causing the capital crisis.1 Yet the roots of this crisis also include a awed
regulatory philosophy at FDA. While recent critics of FDA have also pointed
to the slow approval process as a source of
1See e.g. Merrill Lynch, Biotechnology-Human Therapeutics, December
12, 1994, p.1.
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national competitive disadvantage,2 they have not explicitly linked the ap-
proval process to the capital crisis. This paper argues that the FDA's cost
calculus is awed to the extent that it gives excessive weight to the risk of
another aluridine, yet puts very little value on benets to the industry and
its ultimate beneciary, the consumer. That calculus should not be surprising
given the kind of pressures under which the FDA operates; the agency is ogged
publicly by congressional committees for lax oversight of drugs it has permitted
to enter the market, but is rarely penalized politically for injuries and deaths
attributable to natural disease. Nor is this calculus novel; the Hippocratic Oath
instructs doctors to abstain from all intentional wrongdoing and harm. Yet this
aversion to unclean hands is awed: the FDA should internalize the costs of
drugs left undeveloped and diseases left untreated because of excessive regula-
tory delays even if the agency risks a few more deaths in clinical trials. The
FDA's regulatory calculus should be guided by a simple utilitarian weighing
of harms that is admittedly easier for John Stuart Mill than Hippocrates and
David
Kessler: Five deaths of willing patients (who understood and volunteered
for the treatments they received) in the course of hundreds of clinical
2See e.g., The President's Council on Competitiveness, Report ~ National
Biotechnolocxv Policy, February 1991. Ironically, while the Council on Com-
petitiveness was patriotically concerned that European and Japanese companies
would take advantage of regulatory handicaps in the US, the major eorts to
capitalize on regulatory disparities have been made recently by American com-
panies themselves. Many have begun to shift R&D to Europe where government
oversight of R&D and clinical trials is less restrictive. It is unclear, however,
whether safety has been compromised in the process since regulatory speed may
suggest laxity as well as eciency. If that is the case, then the FDA's overcau-
tious approach (discussed below) may perversely lead to drugs that are less safe
as US rms ock to Europe. (European development does not, however, skirt
the US approval process entirely since FDA must still approve drugs for the
U.S. market.)
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trials are inconsequential when compared to the benets resulting from
prospective and existing drugs.
B. Structure
Part I describes the current capital crisis in the biotech industry. Part II
examines its consequences for R&D. Part III investigates various factors con-
tributing to the capital crisis. Part IV describes the role of FDA regulation
in causing the crisis and the eect of government regulation on industry and
consumer costs. Part IV examines possibilities for reform.
Note that for simplicity, this paper simply discusses biotech drugs and ig-
nores food and environmental applications which have similar characteristics.
7702-7825-1
Part I: The Capital Crisis
The paradox of biotech nancing in recent years has been the appearance of
prosperity. While various stock market indices of biotech performance have
swung wildly from famine to feast and then back to famine (most recently with
the assistance of alleged stock manipulator David Blech),3 the amount of money
owing into the industry has increased relatively steadily to $4.7 billion in 1994
from $3.7 billion in l993.~ In the context of the debate on price controls, the
current administration has pointed with apparent justication to these numbers
as signs that the industry is healthy.5
This is misleading for two reasons:
(i) Rate of Soendino. Biotech companies do not spend money at a constant
rate. The burn rate of a biotech company, a widely used measure of a company's
ongoing capital needs, is not a xed number. As companies move from early-
stage laboratory research to later-stage human clinical trials and manufacturing
plant construction, its needs for capital increase. For example, the burn rate
of Synergen, a late-stage biotech company, was $140 million in 1993 while the
burn rate for Icos, an earlier-stage biotech company, was $20 million.6 Hence,
we ought to
~8E1 of biotech stocks declined in value in 1994. Biotech Newswatch,
January 16, 1995, p.3.
4These gures are for the scal years ended June, 1993 and June, 1994.
(Ernst & Young, Ninth Annual Report on the Biotechnoloov Industry,
1994.)
5See e.g. Reginald Rhein, Is BIO Crying Wolf with Anti-Health Plan
Lobbying?, Biotechnoloav Newswatch, March 7, 1994, p.1.
6Lehman Brothers, Bio-Financials, 1993, p.47.
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expect that as the industry moves from a predominantly early-stage group of
startups to maturity, that its needs for capital will increase. That expectation is
borne out by the industry median burn rate, which has increased{as the industry
has aged{from $6 million per year in 1991 to $20 million per year in l993.~ The
conclusion: xed capital inows in conjunction with increasing capital needs
will create a crisis.
(ii) More rms. The biggest problem with the steady cash stream is that
there are more mouths to feed than there were ve years ago. Emboldened by
the success of Amgen, Genentech and other early biotech pioneers, a wave of
startups went public during the period from 1991 to 1994. This period was a
waterfall of money, one CEO nostalgically recalls. You held out your cup and
it was full.8 Yet this waterfall creates an almost insatiable need for renancing
as soon the money raised an initial public oering (IPO) runs out. Since IPOs
typically raise about $23 million and since the burn rate for the median drug
company is $20 million9 (the average is $26 million), a new biotech company will
have only enough nancing to last for about 14 months before it returns to the
market for more money. (Note that this calculation is somewhat exaggerated
because early-stage companies need less cash than later stage companies, as
discussed above.) Whereas a handful of rms competed for funding in the early
1980s, now 1310 rms vie for funding. As a result, roughly 501 of the industry
is within two
7Bio-Financials, p. 47. This is the burn rate for the universe of public
companies. When non-public companies, which outnumber public companies
are included in this calculation, the average burn rate in 1993 was $665,000 per
month or about $8 million annually. (Ernst & Young, p. 54)
8Daniel Green, Survey of Venture and Development Capital, Financial Times,
September 23, 1994, p. iv.
9Bio-Financials, p. 47.
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years of bankruptcy or ameout at current burn rates.'0 If the pool of new
capital remains constant, as it has in recent years, then the industry will die a
slow (and perhaps unspectacular) death due to capital deprivation.
One sign that something is amiss is the diversion of money earmarked for
biotech from the US to foreign biotech rms. Investors increasingly frustrated
by returns on domestic drug development, yet still condent in the future of the
industry, are shifting funds to Europe in particular. If US investment prospects
were attractive, the funds would remain at home.
A more subtle, but no less important, sign that something is deeply wrong
is composition of the $4 billion owing into the industry. Unlike the euphoria of
the IPO market in the late 1980s and early 1990s in which the public markets
pumped money into startups at inated prices that subsequently have fallen
dramatically, much of the current investment is coming from later-stage venture
capital rms and from institutional private placements (largely from insurance
compani,es) These investors are more demanding than the credulous public IPO
investor: they require extensive equity in return for their investment, often in
the form of shares that are discounted from the publicly quoted market price
of the stock. (Private Investment in Public Enterprise nancings (Pipes) are
the most recent incarnation of this trend.) Biotech companies would prefer to
raise funds in booming biotech markets when stock prices are high and equity
is therefore relatively less '0Ernst & Young, p. 54.
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costly. But given their burn rates, these companies' need for cash is im-
mediate and they cannot aord to wait. Bank nancing is not an alternative
for all but a few of the largest biotech rms. Desperation therefore forces them
into the arms of venture capitalists and insurance companies who extract equity
from them on highly unfavorable terms. This equity is not given away lightly:
in most cases, even where companies are already public, the largest sharehold-
ers (sometimes the majority shareholders) are the companies' founders whose
personal assets and self-worth are inextricably bound up with the company's.
Their choice{bankruptcy or dilution{is only made, therefore, out of desperation.
Part II: Implications of the Capital Crisis
The immediate consequence of this severe capital shortage is that R&D will
suer. Capital inows have risen steadily, yet the pace of scientic discovery
has risen much faster. Currently, although the industry is receiving funding of
$4 billion annually, the industry is spending $7 billion annually on R&D. (That
gap understates the extent of the problem since all biotech companies make cash
expenditures on overhead, and the later-stage companies have manufacturing
and marketing expenses as well.) This extraordinary decit cannot continue. In
the absence of additional nancing{which does not appear to be forthcoming{
biotech companies will have no choice but to cut R&D expenditures to survive.
This will likely occur in several ways as companies focus their spending on drugs
that have the highest probability of winning FDA approval in the shortest period
of time. Companies rst will stop research on drugs in early development since
11I
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they will not generate cash for ve to ten years. Hence we ought to ex-
pect that numerous potentially life-saving compounds will go unexamined in
the future. Second, a shortage of R&D funds discourages innovation and exper-
imentation in later development. Companies with drugs in clinical trials will
no longer be able to aord to undertake multiple trials with varying levels of
dosages, in varying forms, and for varying indications. Since they do not have
sucient funds to attempt a trial-and-error approach to see what works, they
will make an educated guess based on what little data is available. Uncertainty
is not necessarily problematic, but the history of biotechnology (and indeed sci-
ence) is that many discoveries (insulin) were serendipitous. Serendipity has no
place in the new capital-poor regime, and society will lose the benet of what
might have been discovered as a result. Finally, decreased funding for devel-
opment eorts means not only that these companies will have to constrict the
scope of their clinical trials, but that scale will suer as well. While the cost of
such trials varies according to duration and the intensity of patient monitoring
(among other factors), clinical trials{particularly in phase Ill{are as a general
matter, extraordinarily costly. Cash-poor companies will have little choice but
to reduce the number of patients enrolled in trials. This raises the possibility
that dangerous side eects, invisible on a small scale, but visible on a larger
scale might slip past the clinical testing process. Hence, FDA's justied
There is already indirect evidence that this is occurring to the extent that
venture capital investors are shifting their interest and resources from early-stage
companies with distant prospects (historically their main focus) to later-state
companies that are closer to market (via mezzanine funds) . Consequently, the
number of startups has fallen for the rst time since the industry's inception,
although the absolute amount of cash inow has increased. (Ernst & Young,
p.28)
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insistence that clinical trials meet minimum statistically signicant thresh-
holds. But the more serious problem is less a safety issue than an eectiveness
issue: it is more dicult to show eectiveness the smaller the patient sample.
Hence, the real risk here is that drugs which may help only a small subsegment
of a larger population may appear to be ineective and therefore will be rejected
entirely. This may be one explanation for the string of recent failures among
new biotech drugs. For all of these reasons, then, diminished R&D expenditures
will likely lead to fewer drugs reaching ailing consumers who need them.
Part III: Factors Contributing to the Capital Crisis
Why are investors so reluctant to fund an industry that may ultimately
replace stodgy traditional pharmaceutical companies as the source of new drugs?
The main reasons are risk and timing. The returns that investors demand are
aected both by the likelihood that projected cash ows will occur and by the
immediacy of the ows. Drugs score poorly on both counts: returns are highly
uncertain and cash ows do not begin until the distant future.
The combination of riskiness and time to market is devastating because
each problem compounds the other. In order for an investor to break even on a
relatively risk-free drug, he would require a return of 2601 over a 10-year drug
development horizon at a discount rate of 10%. However, drugs are crapshoots:
only one in ten'2 entering clinical trials makes it to market and some companies
have only a single drug in '2G Kirk Raab, Embryonic, Th~ Economist, August
27, 1994, p.6.
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their portfolio. By some estimates that raises the discount rate to between
15% and 35%~13 Assuming a relatively conservative 20%, our company must
now return an astounding 6201 over its 10 year development cycle.
Not surprisingly, once-euphoric investors who plowed considerable funds into
biotech startups during the boom over the past decade have been sorely disap-
pointed. While several companies' drugs have made it to market successfully,
the overwhelming majority have remained in the product pipeline. As a result,
even companies with highly promising drugs are unable to attract capital. Are
investors simply displaying a superstitious aversion to throwing good money
after bad? While the markets' occasional ineciency and vulnerability to psy-
chology may explain some market phenomena, investors' hesitation here is the
result of several factors, some well-documented, each of which aects the risk
and timing elements of investors' calculations:
(i) Price Controls. Industry banking analysts frequently cite the prospect of
price controls as the source of the industry's capital crisis. Since the cost of a
drug ranges from $200 to $350 million by the time it gets to market (including
direct R&D, marketing, and manufacturing costs as well as the indirect cost
of failed drugs),'4 prices must compensate for development costs. If prices are
regulated,
'3See e.g., E.M. Hurwitz et al., Biotechnology 1993 Review/1994 Preview,
Smith Barney Shearson, January 20, 1994, p.26. Fidelity uses a discount rate of
up to 401. George Anders, Power Player, Wall .r. Journal, May 20, 1994, p.R16.
'4Estimates vary here. See e.g. Oce of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical
R&D: ~ and Rewards, 1993, which found a fully-loaded cost of $194 million.
14(14)
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therefore, drug companies (and hence investors) will be unable to recoup
their investment. The threat of health care-related price regulation thus in-
creases the riskiness of drug approvals. But this mantra-like insistence on price
controls as the reason for biotech nancing problems is probably overstated.
Health reform might actually encourage the use of biologically-derived drugs{
even at premium prices{because many act as substitutes for more costly chemi-
cal therapeutics or surgical procedures, and thus result in the kind of net savings
that health reform is attempting to promote.
(ii) Weak Patents. Publicized disputes such as Amgen's EPO battle illus-
trate the fragility of patents. Ignoring the costliness of patent litigation which
is not inconsequential, the uncertainty of patent protection simply increases the
riskiness of an already risky drug approval process. The risks are twofold: rst,
that a company may not have any rights to its discovery altogether; or sec-
ond, that a company's patent may be construed so narrowly as to weaken the
monopoly it grants during the patent's life. Investors may also legitimately fear
that the resolution of patent questions will take place late in the developmental
process, after extensive research, developmental and manufacturing costs have
been sunk. Weak patents therefore increase the riskiness of drug investments .~
'51n an unfortunate burst of regulatory zeal, the Patent and Trademark Of-
ce (PTO) has interpreted a judicially required practical utility test to mean
that it must scrutinize the ecacy of biotech drugs and precursor substances be-
fore patents can be granted. As a result, the PTO has begun to look very similar
to FDA. Under pressure, PTO agreed to reexamine its standards, and recently
agreed to accept less comprehensive test data to show that a substance has a
plausible use. Drug Patent Rules Will Simplify Process for Biotech Concerns,
Wall Street Journal, December 23, 1994, p.B5.
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(iii) DruQ Failures. The prospects for biotechnologically-derived drugs are
intrinsically unpredictable. Ecacy and safety can be projected in a lab setting
through animal testing, but such projections rarely are denitive. As a result,
numerous promising products fail at the clinical stage. Recent examples include
Centocor's Centoxin, Synergen's Antril, and Gensia's Protara.'6 Leaving aside
for the moment whether the FDA's hurdles for safety and eectiveness are rea-
sonable, the possibility of drug failure is very real and increases the risk level
borne by investors. Nonetheless, this factor is also easily overstated since the
uncertain prospects for traditional chemically-derived drugs have been known
for some time, and it is dicult to imagine that investors would fail to an-
ticipate the same would be true of biologically-derived drugs. Many investors
in fact ought to have anticipated a high failure rate by consciously diversi-
fying their biotech holdings in order to create a portfolio aect. Hence, the
high failure rate for individual biotech rms does not necessarily create prob-
lems for investors holding larger portfolios as long as the winners more than
compensate for the losers. While some drug companies ought not to get fund-
ing because their drugs truly lack merit{a judgment communicated through by
venture capitalists- -most drug companies have sound ideas, but do not oer
investors sucient returns to entice investors.
'6Rhonda Rundle, Biotech 'Jinx' Strikes the Hope of San Diego, Wall Street
Journal, October 18, 1994, p. Bl.
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(iv) Time to Market. Some drug companies (notably Genzyme) record pos-
itive cash ow from drug research done on a contract basis. Leaving aside the
question of whether this is simply accounting gimmickry to recognize as revenue
that which is really expense, this is the only operating cash ow that companies
receive until their drugs reach market. Since this money, along with outside
nancing, is spent entirely on drug research and development, companies gen-
erate no positive cash ow until the drugs themselves reach the end consumer
markets. Because this process can take from ve to eighteen years,'7 investors
will need to wait that long for returns on their investment. But investors are
impatient since money tied up in drug development cannot be invested in com-
mensurately risky investments elsewhere. They therefore demand returns to
compensate them for the delay.
Part IV: FDA
Congress last visited the topic of regulating biologically-derived substances
in 1902 when it passed the Biologics Act after a batch of contaminated vaccine
reached the market. In the interim years, with the nation's vaccination pro-
grams proceeding smoothly, Congress surprisingly has not revisited the topic
legislatively despite innumerable hearings. As a result, the FDA has enjoyed
enormous discretion in regulating biotechnology as the eld has emerged. Al-
though it shares jurisdiction over biologics with EPA, USDA, OSHA, DOT and
several other agencies,
'7One recent Thfts University study found that the pipeline from discovery
to market lasted between 11 and 17.8 years. Ted Bunker, A New Prescription
for Biotech, Investor's Business Daily, November 4, 1994,
p. Al.
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under the Coordinated Framework, FDA is uniquely responsible for regu-
lating drug development. The agency consequently has wide latitude in setting
standards and procedures for biotech drug approvals, as it does for ordinary
drugs.
(i) Approvals
The time-to-market problem is well-known, but what has been less clear is
the role that FDA regulation has played in deterring capital from entering the
industry. FDA views its role as ensuring safety and ecacy. Time is therefore
relatively unimportant to the FDA since delays in the approval process do not
make drugs any less safe or eective when they nally emerge. The FDA's
calculation thus places an almost innite value on preventing a aluridine or a
thalidomide from penetrating the approval process and a very low priority on
accelerating approval for everything else.
Until recently, FDA typically required two years to evaluate New Drug Ap-
plications (NDAs) after three years of clinical trials had been completed. After
industry pressure, Congress passed the User-Fee Act in 1992, under which in-
dustry eectively agreed to pay its own way in the approval process. In return,
FDA pledged to streamline the process. Whether this has actually happened
is unclear. The agency proudly points to reduced approval times as evidence
of improvement. Indeed, agency gures show that median approval times have
been cut in half from about
18(L~)
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two years to one.'8 Yet these statistics are deceptive: the agency approved
just one new therapeutic biological drug in 1994. More importantly, the agency
measures its performance only when the review process formally starts. The
problem: before the ocial stopwatch begins, the agency has begun to demand
even more data from drug manufacturers.'9 Hence, PLA's have decreased sig-
nicantly, miraculously clearing the backlog which has bedeviled FDA for the
past decade. While the formal review stage may be shorter, drugs will not get
approval any more quickly.
Until recently, to outsiders such as those sitting on Congressional commit-
tees, this was as it should be: speed was equated with a lack of caution. But
speed and caution are not incompatible. Delay imposes costs of foregone drug
development that are indirect and less visible than aluridine deaths, but are
no less real. These costs are twofold:
(a) Current Patients. Until recently, this group was denied access to as-yet-
unapproved drugs unless patients were participants in clinical trials. Even then,
access to experimental drugs was not assured since the decision to administer
placebo or drug to a patient in a clinical trial was left to the discretion of the
designer of the study. These
~8Lisa Piercey, FDA Review Times, Approvals are Down, Bio World Today,
January 19, 1995, p.1.
'9Drug User Fee Review Times May Be Ripe for Oversight From Republicans,
Pink ~ 56 (46), November 14, 1994. While the FDA has not been publicity-
shy in announcing the speed (nine months) with which it approved Genentech's
Pulmozyme, the company spent more time than would ordinarily be the case
in Phase III trials in order to bring a stronger case to FDA. Pulmozyme Devel-
opment May be Prototype for Other Biotech Products, ~ ~ 56 (1), January 3,
1994.
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restrictions have been lifted slightly to permit patients with serious or imme-
diately life-threatening disease to receive the drug concurrently with the clinical
trial as long as alternatives are not available (which, presumably they are not,
since by denition, a new drug is unlikely to be developed if comparable prod-
ucts are already on the market) . Of course, this only applies to a narrow class
of patients. Others are denied access to experimental drugs awaiting approval
even if they consent after being informed of the risks. Although there is a real
possibility that manufacturers will exploit this exception to sell unapproved
drugs and make and end-run around the historically sacrosanct notion of FDA
pre-market approval,20 it seems more problematic for the agency to deny drugs
to chronically ill patients who want them. This is particularly the case because
patients have precisely the incentives to correctly evaluate drugs that the risk-
averse FDA lacks: they may be willing to accept a risky drug as long as its
expected benets exceed its expected risks. This does not solve the paradox of
informed consent: while consent may be informed to the extent that a patient
understands that a drug is risky, how can a non-expert patient truly assess a
drug's risks if it takes two years of analysis by FDA experts who have made such
investigations their life's work? The counterargument is that patients make such
decisions every day when deciding to take over-the-counter drugs, a risk-benet
decision made on the y at the
20FDA attempts to limit this risk by prohibiting the manufacturer from
promoting the drug and requiring the manufacturer diligently to seek approval
for the drug while the back-door sales are occurring. These limitations seem
rather hollow: the manufacturer might attempt to promote the drug through
the news media, although the government has restricted that kind of behavior as
to unapproved uses of approved drugs. Similarly, a manufacturer can skirt the
diligence requirement by insisting on more tests. This would put the agency in
the politically incongruous position of insisting on fewer tests and complaining
about approval delays.
20(~)
702-7825-1
drugstore. Though the risks are admittedly less serious for these kinds of
drugs, our treatment of over-the-counter drugs nonetheless suggests that we have
permitted patient choice in other contexts and should extend it here, although
not in a cavalier way. (In this case, unlike over-the-counter drugs, unapproved
drugs ought only to be available after meeting the scrutiny of a doctor who must
prescribe them.)
(b) Prospective Patients. Ultimately the more insidious impact of delay is
on prospective patients who likely would not even know that a drug would
have been available to them. Returning to our familiar perspective of the im-
patient investor, delay costs edgling biotech companies in two ways. First,
delay diminishes sales from the new drug which would have occurred during
the approval period. Note that these sales are foregone, not simply postponed,
because under ordinary circumstances (for non-Orphan drugs), the patent clock
continues to tick irrespective of the speed of approval. Since a patent ordinarily
lasts 17 years and the time elapsed from drug inception to approval can range
from 5 years to 18, the market monopoly conferred by the patent may last just
a few years, although the strignency of current regulation deters generics from
entering as eortlessly as they do in the synthetic drug context.21 By the FDA's
own conservative estimate, every month that a drug is withheld from the mar-
ket represents foregone income of $10 million.22 Reducing the FDA's approval
period from 23 months to 12
21Generic biologic manufacturers must meet safety and eectiveness require-
ments that would not otherwise have to be met if the drug is chemical.
22This estimate is conservative because it implies annual sales of $120 million
for a given drug. Revenues are higher for so-called blockbuster drugs. The top
ten best-selling biotechnology drugs each averaged $430 million in sales in 1993.
(Ernst & Young, p.14). This estimate is also
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months, as the FDA says occurred in 1994, would therefore result in $120
million in revenue for each manufacturer- -enough to keep the average biotech
company alive for six years. Second, delay costs biotech companies that must
continue to service carrying costs during the approval period. These carrying
costs are not simply the company's actual cash outlays for overhead which to-
gether constitute the burn rate. They also include the imputed cost to investors'
capital. If for example in our earlier hypothetical, the return period were short-
ened from 10 years to 9, the total return that investors would require to nance
the project would fall by 1001.23
In the immediate term, these added costs (or potential savings, depending on
one's perspective) are either absorbed by consumers in the form of higher prices
or by investors in the form of lower returns. In the longer term, if such costs are
not passed along to consumers, then investors will respond by contributing less
nancing to biotechnology ventures and companies will respond by developing
fewer drugs.
(ii) Clinical Trials
The aluridine case illustrates what happens when a clinical trial goes awry.
First, there are deaths{in this case from unexpected
conservative because it apparently fails to take into account worldwide drug
sales, which account for about 20% of drug revenues, by one estimate. Robert
Bohrer, What is Biotechnology, 55 University 2~ Pittsburoh Law Review (1994)
607, 608. Although other nations have independent drug approval processes,
since these nations honor the ndings of the FDA as they would their own,
some companies wait for FDA approval before seeking approval abroad.
23(l2)~9...5l6% vs. (l.2)'~l0=6l9%.
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liver toxicity. Then, there are recriminations: was the manufacturer care-
less in conducting the tests? Was the FDA lax in overseeing them? Pressure
builds, then the agency responds with new regulations designed to prevent a
recurrence.24
This now-familiar pattern of legislative and regulatory response to tragedy
has been repeated{in 1813, in 1902, and again in 1938{with favorable results,
suggesting that scandal and tragedy are valuable prods to a sleepy Congress and
FDA. But in this instance, FDA is not sleepy; its thousands of regulators are
wide awake. The aluridine scare unfortunately pushed the FDA further in what
is already the wrong direction. FDA responded by requiring additional reporting
of adverse eects- -in eect, attempting to require vigilance.25 Taken alone these
new requirements sound sensible. But they add to what already is a crushing
administrative burden on small biotech rms racing against time through the
approval process in order to test products that may save thousands of lives{
not just the ve involved in Phase I clinical trials. Under FDA's oversight, the
size{and therefore the expense{of clinical trials grew signicantly in the 80s.26
Not surprisingly, therefore, the proverbial struggling biotech rm may run out
of cash before even reaching Phases II and III if Phase I is too costly. Once
24John Schwartz, FDA Moves to Improve Safety of New Drugs, WashinQton Post,
p. AlO. Federal ReQister, vol. 59, No. 207, p. 54038. 25lronically, while an
FDA investigation squarely blamed the trial researchers for failing to spot early
warning signs in the incident, the NIH (which had equally self-serving motives)
subsequently cleared its own researchers, concluding in eect that no amount of
additional prudence or analysis would have saved patients' lives. Eliot Marshall,
Drug Deaths Deemed Unavoidable, Science, June 10, 1994, p. 1530. 260 ice of
Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D.
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again, the agency has made a poor calculation between lives lost to experi-
mental drugs and lives lost to prospective drugs left undeveloped.
(iii) Discrimination
While the FDA's approval delays occur irrespective of whether the product in
question has been biologically or chemically derived, other aspects of FDA reg-
ulations treat biologicals more stringently than their chemically-derived coun-
terparts. The discriminatory treatment is a legacy of early fears from the Rifkin
era about biologicals that have not been borne out. Although many of the orig-
inal ethical questions remain unresolved, these issues should not be under the
purview of the FDA in any case since they are political questions. By contrast,
the earlier fears about safety, are clearly in the FDA's bailiwik, but have been
largely answered. Consequently, to a limited degree, the FDA has recognized its
anomalous treatment of biological drugs and has moved to equalize treatment
with traditional pharmaceuticals. In 1986, the agency adopted a Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology under which it agreed to assess
drugs according to their product characteristics (presumably use, side eects,
novelty) and not according to the process by which they were made (biotech-
nology) . This outcome recognized that biotechnologically-derived substances
in many instances are indistinguishable from their chemical counterparts. In
some cases, biotechnology simply permits a known substance to be manufac-
tured cheaply on a large scale, a feat which may have been impossible with
chemical methods that could produce quantities too small to be commercially
viable. The agency also recognized that as with
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traditional drugs, some are riskier than others; the level of risk depends on
the drug's novelty and application.
Unfortunately, that philosophy has been applied inconsistently. For exam-
ple, for conventional chemical drugs, the FDA has waived the onerous NDA re-
quirements in favor of a shortened and much less time-consuming Abbreviated
NDA (ANDA) in instances where new drugs are chemically equivalent to listed
drugs that have already been approved. Nonetheless, for biologically-derived
drugs with identical chemical structures, the agency has required applicants to
go through the full NDA process. Since time-to-market is such a crucial de-
terminant of a biotech company's willingness and ability to begin development
eorts, this kind of discriminatory treatment may act as a signicant deterrent
to drug development.
Discrimination is more overt in manufacturing certication. Although the
probability of success for a drug increases as the drug nears nal approval, a high
level of uncertainty remains. This poses a problem for the drug manufacturer
which must decide at what point it should create a full-scale manufacturing
facility in anticipation of approval. This is not an obvious decision: if it waits
too long to create a factory, it has wasted part of the precious and fast-closing
window of opportunity between approval and patent expiration. Yet if it builds
the factory too soon, it runs the risk that the drug fails clinical trials or that
its approval is signicantly delayed by FDA while more tests are run. An idle
factory increases the company's burn rate; a dedicated facility that will never
be used is an investment that
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will never be recovered.27 This is also not a trivial decision: because of the
sophistication of the equipment, the costs of constructing a drug factory are
enormous.
Although all drug manufacturers face this predicament, biological drug mak-
ers are at an enormous disadvantage. Although drug manufacturers must in-
clude similar plant information in their new drug application (NDA) and are
subject to inspection,28 they do not have to be precleared. By contrast, biolog-
ical drug manufacturers cannot wait to build until a drug's chances of approval
have improved because under the Biologics Act of 1902, the FDA requires that
biotech companies seek premarket certication of their manufacturing facility
(ELA) concurrently with the drug approval application (PLA). The corollary
of the rule is that if the manufacturing process or facility is changed, the ap-
proval process must be repeated. The rationale: what makes biologics unique is
the process by which they are derived. Since potentially harmful bacteria and
viruses are often present throughout the manufacturing process, slight changes
in the manufacturing process can cause signicant contamination in the output
of the process and the FDA believes consistency and therefore safety can only
be ensured by prior certication.
27This became painfully clear recently to Centocor which had put the nish-
ing touches on an enormous factory in Leiden, The Netherlands, shortly before
the failure of Centoxin, its sepsis drug. Udayan Gupta, Now or Never, Wall
Street Journal, May 20, 1994, p.R12. 28Regulation of chemical and biotech
plants has converged in recent years as FDA scrutiny of chemical facilities has
increased.
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Taken together these manufacturing restrictions impose disproportionate
costs on biotech companies{the very companies that can least aord to bear
them.29 Biotech companies, living precariously close to their ameout date,
must incur enormous manufacturing costs during Phase III tests even though
these expenditures might be wasted entirely if a drug fails FDA approval. The
restrictions also raise the same dangers that Good Manufacturing Practices
(GMPs) pose for ordinary pharmaceuticals. First, there remains an intractable
conict between narrowly specifying what the standards should be and in doing
so stiing innovation, or permitting innovation but inviting agency discretion
by leaving the rules deliberately vague. In the biotechnology context, the risk
of reduced innovation is particularly problematic. Once a process has been cer-
tied as complying, the FDA rules create enormous disincentives for process
innovations since suciently signicant innovations can trigger the approval
process again. Such innovations not only include improved processes that save
the company money, but also innovations that improve drug consistency by
lowering defect rates. These kinds of innovations which benet consumers will
not be made by companies who cannot aord to stop production for facility
recertication while the patent clock continues to tick. At an industry wide
level, therefore, the incentives are quite perverse: since the FDA's denition of
industry standards is tautologically dependent on what good manufacturers do
in practice, since no company has the
29Regulation proponents point out that biotech companies can subcontract
their factory to more experienced drug manufacturers. This makes considerable
economic sense since expertise will likely reduce costs, but it does not eliminate
the costs of a dedicated facility. If these costs are born by the contract manu-
facturer, the biotech will have to pay for them, either in cash (unlikely) or by
giving away royalties to the drug if it reaches the market.
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incentive to improve its practices, the industry standard will never change.
Conversely, no company has an incentive to innovate and therefore deviate from
the industry standard since non-conformity suggests to the FDA that a com-
pany's practices might not be good.
Discrimination will become increasingly anomalous as the distinctions be-
tween traditional drug and biotech companies blur. A biotech company is a
pharmaceutical company, one industry advocate has observed, only not encum-
bered with revenue.30 Already, 30% of pharmaceuticals' research is biotechnology-
based.3' As biotech companies desperate for cash surrender control to pharma-
ceutical companies, that percentage will grow. This highlights the inequity in
treatment between two disciplines whose work is scientically comparable, yet
treated dierently by the FDA. Nonetheless, simply because companies merge
does not mean as a logical matter that science must be merging also. But
that is in fact what is happening: biotechnologists have increasingly turned to
chemistry during the development and manufacturing process. The FDA should
recognize the collapse of its already articial distinction.
Part V: Reform Proposals
Several kluge solutions to the current capital crisis have been proposed:
30Carl Feldbaum, as quoted in Mario Aguilera, Biotechs' FDA Gripes
Reported, San DieQo Daily Transcript, October 6, 1994, p. Al.
31PMA Warning on Future of Biotechnology, Marketletter, September 27,
1993.
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(i) Defer tO the Market. After biotech rms have exhausted private equity{
even on unfavorable terms{and in order to preserve their companies, if not
control, many have begun to sell out to traditional pharmaceutical companies.
While these combinations are appealing to pharmaceutical makers (they help re-
plenish depleted research pipelines) and to biotechs (they help achieve economies
of scale in marketing and manufacturing and give biotechs much-needed exper-
tise in navigating the regulatory process) and are becoming more prevalent,
they do nothing to solve the industry's fundamental problem. Whether biotech
companies are owned by shoestring entrepreneurs or by Merck, returns for new
drug R&D remain unattractive because of risk and timing. Pharmaceutical
combinations do not change this.
(ii) Provide tax breaks for biotechnoloav investors. This proposal recognizes
correctly that unless investors achieve higher returns, money coming into the
industry will continue to be inadequate. Tax benets eectively lower these
investors' capital costs. But because this proposal treats symptoms rather than
disease, it is inecient: by providing subsidies to investors the government ef-
fectively pays twice-once in forgone tax revenue, and again for an expensive
FDA scrutiny of drug approval applications. Meanwhile, while tax breaks solve
the investment and R&D problem, they do nothing to speed access to drugs by
current patients since drug approvals will continue to be delayed. Additionally,
they are inequitable, since the same nancing characteristics and regulatory con-
cerns apply to ordinary pharmaceuticals as to biotech products; if one receives
preferential
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treatment, they both should. Why should Icos be treated more favorably
than Merck?
(iii) Create an exception to new accountinQ rules. Proponents of this plan,
including the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), seek to exempt the
industry from new Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rules that
compel companies to estimate and reveal the value of stock options doled out to
executives and to dock earnings accordingly. This proposal seems supercially
appealing since cash-poor biotech rms frequently prefer to pay executives in
stock not cash. Yet the proposal ignores the behavior of venture capitalists
and other investors who look at cash ows and burn rates not at accounting
earnings. Biotech earnings are already so depressed as to be meaningless. Few
would be deceived by phony bookkeeping. Further, the proposal's aim is simple
deception since it would allow biotech rms to make less disclosure than rms
in other industries{a situation that is both inequitable and unethical.
(iv) Create a private-sector alternative to FDA. This proposal, contemplated
by several conservative Washington think tanks,32 would create a shadow FDA
comprised of private sector physicians and academics drafted for the purpose of
evaluating drug approvals. These free-market proponents argue that construct-
ing a private-sector approval organization to compete with FDA would create a
market in drug
32lnterview, Geoery Pierce, Citizens for a Sound Economy, January 23,
1995. As of this writing, none of these think tanks, which also include the Cato
Institute and the Gingrich-aliated Progress and Freedom Foundation, have
published their proposals on FDA reform.
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approvals, and would thereby create incentives for FDA to reduce approval
times to stay competitive. While a shadow FDA directly addresses the under-
lying problem, it goes too far: it would not be dicult to imagine a race to
the bottom in which the two organizations compete not only by accelerating
approvals, but by lowering safety standards. The approval panel with the most
porous safety standards likely would attract the most takers in this articial
marketplace. The industry should get speed, but not permissiveness. Think-
tank staers have not yet come up with a coherent answer to this problem.33
On the other hand, while they lack the ideological purity of free-market
polemics, direct regulatory reforms are a more sensible way to correct the reg-
ulatory crisis:
(i) Approvals
Given the enormous costs in foregone drug development that result from
the long approval process, FDA should do what it can to shorten the process.
The nal clinical trial phase probably cannot be substantially shortened for two
reasons. First, clinical trials must be performed sequentially, not in parallel, so
that the knowledge gained from earlier trials can determine the design of later
trials or whether they should be held at all. Second, since there is a minimum
latency period for some toxic eects of various drugs, there is a minimum natural
limit on the duration of clinical trials. To shorten the trials below this limit
33lnterview, Geoery Pierce.
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would be to lower the FDA's hurdle for eectiveness and safety. We would
prefer instead to increase speed without decreasing safety.
It is no coincidence that to the extent there has been discussion of this
problem (in debates over the User Fee Act), the focus has been on shortening
the approval phase. No viruses incubate during this part of the process; on the
contrary, the approval period is simply an opportunity for the FDA to review
the voluminous statistics submitted by the manufacturer. Since the agency
by its own estimate will collect $343 million in user fees in l995,~~ it cannot
plead inadequate resources as a barrier to reduced approval times. Rather than
gaming the approval process to present rosy statistics for public consumption,
the FDA should continue to make meaningful reductions in approval times.
(ii) Availability for Unapproved Drugs
The agency should make all unapproved drugs available during the clinical
trial process. Provisional drug distribution would ensure patient access to new
drugs and that the agency does not interfere with patient choice. This would
also eliminate inequities as between patients with ailments the agency deems
serious and life-threatening and those whose ailments are merely painful and
chronic. FDA would no longer engage in a comparative victimization analysis
under which it decides which diseases (particularly those with political glamour)
outrank others; the patients themselves would do it. As under the current
system, manufacturers would be barred from promoting the new drugs, ~~13
Biotechnology Law Report 489 (Number 4, July-August 1994).
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either in the press or elsewhere. To ensure informed consent, FDA would
require patients to sign a consent form and to be told the probability of drug
disapproval, based on historical tallies for unapproved drugs at a comparable
stage.35 Only seriously desperate patients would likely want to play those kind
of odds.36
(iii) Manufacturing
FDA should end the disparity between its treatment of chemical and bio-
logical manufacturing facilites. By requiring biotech companies to clear these
facilities concurrently with the drug to be manufactured there, the agency is
eectively requiring such rms to substantially increase their ante when virtu-
ally all of their chips are already on a product with an unavoidably high risk
of failure. Allowing biotech companies to wait to exercise their option on plant
construction would eectively raise returns to investors and encourage invest-
ment.
* * *
The unavoidable reality is that no amount of regulation will fully eliminate risk
from what is an inherently risky process. The incremental reductions in risk
that result from succeeding waves of FDA regulations
35This goes further than a proposal by the Competitive Enterprise Institute,
a conservative think tank, that would simply require a drug's label to state that
the drug is unapproved. Group Calls for FDA Reform, BNA Health ~ ~ January
13, 1995.
36This type of pre-approval distribution would be advantageous to the extent
that it eectively extends the scope of testing. While these patients would not
be subjected to the same kinds of rigor as clinical trial patients (control groups,
monitoring), this group could provide valuable supplementary information on
safety and ecacy.
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are more than oset by the costs of delay from an already highly scrutinized
process. By removing unnecessary regulatory requirements, the FDA would
contribute signicantly to rejeuvenating the capital markets' interest in the
biotech industry, an outcome that would encourage R&D spending and therefore
innovation. We would then expect to see a wider range of new drugs available
to consumers at lower prices.
34